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THE NOT SO “FAIR” MARKETPLACE FAIRNESS 
ACT AND THE DUE PROCESS AND COMMERCE 
CLAUSE CONCERNS IT RAISES 
MICHELLE CHIONCHIO? 
ABSTRACT 
States have reacted to the rise of Internet commerce as any 
governmental body would, with a “hungry eye” for increased tax 
revenue. Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Quill, and constitu-
tional limitations on state tax jurisdiction, states have developed 
their own nexus statutes that run afoul of the Court’s bright-line 
physical presence rule. What is more, “brick and mortar” estab-
lishments interested in “leveling the playing field” with their 
high-tech competition wholeheartedly support the states in their 
endeavor. In proposing the Marketplace Fairness Act (MFA), a 
bill intended to restore state sovereignty regarding sales and use 
tax laws, Congress too has seemingly sided with the states. The 
MFA legislatively “overrules” Quill by replacing Quill’s bright-line 
rule of physical presence with one of economic nexus, a proposi-
tion that neither Bellas Hess nor McIntyre stand for. As such, 
the MFA raises a myriad of concerns, most notably Due Process 
and Commerce Clause concerns, that if not addressed will surely 
muddy the waters of an already complex tax system. 
                                                                                                            
? J.D. Candidate 2017, William & Mary Law School. A sincere thank you 
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INTRODUCTION 
A significant portion of a state’s revenue comes from the col-
lection of sales and use taxes.1 Today, forty-five states, plus the 
District of Columbia, impose a sales tax on goods and certain 
services purchased within the state.2 In addition to implement-
ing a statewide sales tax, thirty-eight states have municipalities 
that impose a local-level sales tax.3 The combined result can be 
financially burdensome on consumers, causing them to forum 
shop or to buy products online.4 This has created a problem in 
itself. As more retailers look to the Internet to conduct their 
financial transactions, the question of whether these retailers 
could, or should, be forced to collect a sales tax on their transac-
tions becomes increasingly relevant.5 
This question hinges on the concept of nexus. The United 
States Constitution, specifically the Due Process Clause and 
Commerce Clause, imposes limitations on state tax jurisdiction,6 
so that only retailers with the requisite nexus, or relationship, to 
the taxing state could be taxed or forced to collect a tax.7 For Due 
Process, the general inquiry is whether “some definite link, some 
minimum connection”8 exists between a retailer and the taxing 
                                                                                                            
1 Liz Malm & Ellen Kant, The Sources of State and Local Tax Revenues, TAX 
FOUND. (Jan. 28, 2013), http://taxfoundation.org/article/sources-state-and-local 
-tax-revenues [https://perma.cc/BM8K-FJUC]. 
2 Geoffrey E. Weyl, Quibbling with Quill: Are States Powerless in Enforcing 
Sales and Use Tax-Related Obligations on Out-of-State Retailers?, 117 PENN ST. 
L. REV. 253, 256–57 (2012). The five states that do not impose a statewide 
sales tax are: Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon. 
However, Alaska and Montana charge local-level sales tax. Scott Drenkard & 
Jared Walczak, State and Local Sales Tax Rates in 2015, TAX FOUND. (Apr. 8, 
2015), http://taxfoundation.org/article/state-and-local-sales-tax-rates-2015 [https:// 
perma.cc/2PTF-EDAL]. 
3 Drenkard & Walczak, supra note 2. 
4 Moderately low state sales tax rates could result in high combined state and 
local rates, compared with states that implement only a statewide rate. Id. 
5 Steven C. Salch & Alvin L. Thomas, II, Taxation of Internet Services and 
Transactions—A Few ‘FAQS,’ 34 HOUSTON LAW., 33, 33–37 (Sept.–Oct. 1996). 
6 Id. at 34. 
7 William L.S. Rowe & Emily J. Winbigler, Constitutional Issues in State 
Taxation, 2 (2016). In general, “nexus” is a jurisdictional concept. It refers to 
the connection between a state and an individual that gives the state the 
authority to tax. Id. 
8 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992) (quoting Miller 
Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1954)). 
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state, and whether “… the state has given anything for which it can 
ask return.”9 For the Commerce Clause, the general inquiry is 
whether a tax burdens or discriminates against interstate com-
merce, one of the defining factors being whether a “substantial 
nexus” exists between the retailer and the taxing state.10 While 
“physical presence” within the taxing state indisputably satisfies 
the “substantial nexus” requirement,11 exactly what in-state ac-
tivities establish “physical presence” remains a point of contention, 
especially for online retailers who lack offices or employees in 
the taxing state.12 The Supreme Court answered this question in 
its 1992, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, decision.13 There, the Court 
reaffirmed the bright-line rule of National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. 
Department of Revenue of Illinois,14 that “a vendor whose only 
contacts with the taxing State are by mail or common carrier lacks 
the ‘substantial nexus’ required by the Commerce Clause.”15 
With the rise of e-commerce the “Quill standard” has been 
chastised for its “artificiality;” for predicating the collection and 
remittance of a state’s sales and use tax on the “[physical] pres-
ence in the taxing State of a small sales force, plant, or office.”16 
Thus, states have taken it upon themselves to interpret “physical 
presence” liberally, aggressively asserting nexus over remote on-
line retailers who merely have “a web-link or banner that sits on 
the website”17 of an in-state resident or company, in an attempt 
to bolster their sales tax revenue.18 The result? Nexus statutes 
vary from one state to the next, making it particularly burdensome 
                                                                                                            
9 Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967). 
10 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977); Sara 
Schoenfeld, Much Ado About Nexus: The States Struggle to Impose Sales Tax 
Obligations on Out-of-State Sellers Engaged in E-Commerce, 24 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 263, 266 (2013). 
11 Schoenfeld, supra note 10, at 266. 
12 Id. 
13 Quill, 504 U.S. at 298. 
14 Nat’l Bellas, 386 U.S. at 753. 
15 Quill, 504 U.S. at 299. 
16 Id. at 315. 
17 Sylvia Dion, The Marketplace Fairness Act: What All SMBs (Not Just Inter-
net Retailers) Need to Know, ALLBUSINESS.COM (2013), https://www.allbusiness 
.com/marketplace-fairness-act-what-all-smbs-need-to-know-3280-1.html [https:// 
perma.cc/KF49-P9AE]. Take for example, New York’s “Amazon Taxes.” Id. 
18 Schoenfeld, supra note 10, at 267. 
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for businesses to engage in e-commerce.19 This problem has 
prompted members of Congress to propose the Marketplace Fair-
ness Act (MFA).20 The MFA is intended to simplify “sales tax-
collecting responsibility”21 and to restore the sovereign rights of the 
states, by giving them the power to “compel online and catalog 
retailers (remote sellers), no matter where they are located, to 
collect sales tax at the time of a transaction.”22 By requiring remote 
retailers to collect sales and use taxes from customers within the 
taxing state, regardless of the retailers’ “physical presence” there, 
the MFA legislatively “overrules” Quill.23 That is, it predicates 
tax-collecting obligations on “economic nexus.”24 This Note ad-
dresses the myriad of concerns raised by the MFA, most notably 
the Due Process and Commerce Clause concerns, through an 
analysis of key cases. Part I of this Note provides an overview of 
state and local sales and use taxes. Part II discusses the states’ 
response to the rise of e-commerce. Part III provides an overview 
and analysis of the MFA. Part IV will discuss the Due Process and 
Commerce Clause concerns raised by the MFA. Lastly, Part V 
discusses the administrative concerns raised by the MFA. 
I. OVERVIEW OF STATE AND LOCAL SALES AND USE TAXES 
State sales taxes are a relatively new occurrence, arising 
from the collapse of property tax revenues during the Great 
                                                                                                            
19 Id. at 266. Online retailers must not only determine whether they have 
established a nexus in the state, according to that state’s nexus requirement, 
but also which of its products are subject to the state’s sales tax. Id. 
20 What Is the Marketplace Fairness Act?, TAXCLOUD, http://marketplace 
fairness.org/what-is-the-marketplace-fairness-act/what-is-the-MFA.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2HU6-DC2F]. The MFA was first proposed during the 112th Con-
gress, but expired at the end of that Congress and was never enacted. A new 
version of the MFA was proposed during the 113th Congress (MFA of 2013) 
and the 114th Congress (MFA of 2015). PETER N. BARNES-BROWN ET AL., 1 
INTERNET LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:38. 
21 BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20, § 4.38. 
22 What Is the Marketplace Fairness Act?, supra note 20 (emphasis added); 
see also Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015), 
https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/s698/BILLS-114s698is.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
298R-2FQX]. 
23 Joseph Henchman, Why the Quill Physical Presence Rule Shouldn’t Go 
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Depression.25 Mississippi was the first state to adopt the tax, in 
1930, at a rate of 2 percent.26 By 1940, twenty-two additional states 
jumped on the sales tax bandwagon,27 and today, all but five 
states impose a statewide sales tax.28 Furthermore, thirty-eight 
states have municipalities that impose a local-level sales tax, 
which is added to the rate of the statewide sales tax.29 The num-
ber of sales tax jurisdictions within these thirty-eight states varies 
from state to state. For example, Texas has a total of 1,515 sales 
tax jurisdictions, while Virginia has 174, and Idaho has only 9.30 
Local sales tax is collected in the same manner, and at the same 
time, as state sales tax.31 
But what exactly is a sales tax? A sales tax is a “license or 
privilege tax” imposed on individuals engaged in selling “tangi-
ble personal property” at retail, or providing a “taxable service.”32 
While consumers are responsible for paying the sales tax, retailers 
who have a “substantial nexus” with the taxing state are responsi-
ble for collecting and remitting that state’s sales tax.33 Thus, a 
state’s power in forcing retailers to collect and remit its sales tax is 
generally limited to transactions that occur within its borders.34 
                                                                                                            
25 JOSEPH HENCHMAN, TAX FOUND., BACKGROUND PAPER NO. 69, THE MAR-





28 Drenkard & Walczak, supra note 2, at 3. The five states without a state-
wide sales tax are Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon; 
Alaska and Montana, however, have implemented a local-level sales tax. Id.  
29 Id.; William L.S. Rowe, Sales and Use Tax in Virginia, at 3 (2015). 
30 HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 3–4 (explaining the United States as a 
whole contains 9,998 different sales tax jurisdictions). 
31 Id. at 3. 
32 Treas. Reg. § 1.164-3 (as amended in 1960); Rowe, supra note 29, at 1. 
33 Weyl, supra note 2, at 257; Monika Miles, Tax Nexus, TPP, Exemptions & 
Other Sales Tax Terms, SALESTAXSUPPORT.COM, http://www.salestaxsupport.com 
/sales-tax-information/sales-tax-101/tax-nexus-tpp-exemptions-other-sales-tax 
-terms/ [https://perma.cc/HW3S-9PZ5]. Retailers with a nexus to the taxing state 
are liable for “any sales tax they do not collect and may be subject to fines or 
criminal penalties for non-compliance.” Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 
1129, 1133 (10th Cir. 2016). 
34 Weyl, supra note 2, at 257. The “negative” Commerce Clause imposes 
this limit. JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE TAXATION: SALES AND USE 
TAXES ¶ 16.01[2] (3d ed. 2011). 
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To cover purchases from out-of-state retailers who lack a 
“substantial nexus” with the taxing state, states impose a “com-
pensating use tax.”35 In general, an individual “using or consum-
ing tangible personal property in [the taxing state], or storing such 
property outside [the taxing state] for use or consumption within 
[the taxing state], is liable for the use tax.”36 Use tax is complemen-
tary to sales tax, meaning that a customer who has paid sales tax on 
a purchase is exempt from paying use tax on the same purchase.37 
Use taxes, in theory, were implemented to prevent forum 
shopping; the concern was that consumers, in an attempt to avoid 
paying the sales tax of their state of residence, would purchase 
goods from states with lower or no sales tax.38 Use taxes, however, 
are limited in solving this problem because the burden of remit-
ting the use tax is delegated to the consumer.39 Unlike sales tax, 
which is collected by the retailer at the time of purchase, use tax 
is “self-reported” and is paid by the consumer on his individual 
tax return.40 Although failure to report is a criminal offense, most 
consumers either intentionally or carelessly neglect this respon-
sibility.41 Because these purchases occur beyond state boundaries, 
                                                                                                            
35 Treas. Reg. § 1.164-3; Miles, supra note 33. A state’s use tax rate is 
equal to its statewide sales tax rate, but local level use tax rates may vary by 
jurisdiction. HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 6–7. 
36 Treas. Reg. § 1.164-3; Rowe, supra note 29, at 5. 
37 HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 6. A sales tax is a tax on the purchase of 
an item, while use tax is a tax on the use of an item. Id. 
38 Id. The use tax ensures uniformity; that all tangible property that is 
used or consumed within a state is subject to the same tax burden, regardless 
of whether it was acquired within the state. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 735 
F.3d 904, 907 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. 
Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 66 (1963)). 
39 Treas. Reg. § 1.164-3. HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 7; NINA MANZI, MINN. 
HOUSE RESEARCH DEPT., USE TAX COLLECTION ON INCOME TAX RETURNS IN OTHER 
STATES 4 (2015), http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/usetax.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4GB5-V4XY]. 
40 HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 7; MANZI, supra note 39, at 4. Because of 
these different reporting requirements, sales and use tax regimes “differ 
greatly in effectiveness,” compliance with sales tax being “extremely high,” 
and compliance with use tax being “extremely low.” Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. 
Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1133 (10th Cir. 2016). However, use tax compliance 
tends to be higher in the case of “large purchases or business purchases” that 
are likely to be subjected to state audit. HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 7. 
41 Direct Mktg. Ass’n, 735 F.3d at 907; Weyl, supra note 2, at 258. 
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states often have trouble collecting use taxes, resulting in a sub-
stantial loss of tax revenue.42 
II. THE STATES’ RESPONSE TO THE RISE OF INTERNET COMMERCE 
Americans are spending more and more on e-commerce. In 
2013, Americans spent approximately $263 billion in Internet retail 
purchases, which is a 15 percent increase from 2012.43 Internet 
retail sales increased again in 2014 and 2015, reaching approxi-
mately $304 billion44 and $341.7 billion45 respectively. Forecasts for 
2016 are likely to be equally as promising, based on the first three 
quarterly reports approximating $291.7 billion46 in Internet retail 
purchases. While the world of e-commerce seems to be at its peak, 
growth is expected to continue for another decade.47 
                                                                                                            
42 Weyl, supra note 2, at 258. 
43 HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 7. 
44 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CB15-20, QUARTERLY RETAIL E-COMMERCE SALES 
4TH QUARTER 2014 (2015), http://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical 
/ecomm/14q4.pdf [https://perma.cc/96QG-UAPF]. The $304 billion figure was 
adjusted for seasonal variation, but not for price changes. Id. Allison Enright, 
U.S. annual e-retail sales surpass $300 billion for the first time, INTERNET 
RETAILER (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.internetretailer.com/2015/02/17/us-annual 
-e-retail-sales-surpass-300-billion-first-time [https://perma.cc/4RE7-UZ5Y]. 2014 
marked the first year that Internet retail purchases exceeded the $300 billion 
threshold. Id. 
45 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CB15-20, QUARTERLY RETAIL E-COMMERCE SALES 
4TH QUARTER 2015 (2016), http://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical 
/ecomm/15q4.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U5G-BZCF]. The $341.7 billion figure was 
the estimated e-commerce sales for 2015. Id. 
46 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CB15-133, QUARTERLY RETAIL E-COMMERCE SALES 
3RD QUARTER 2016 (2016), http://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf 
/ec_current.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8RM-U3RH]. The $291.7 billion figure was 
adjusted for seasonal variation, but not for price changes. Id.  
47 See TIMOTHY P. TRAINER & VICKI E. ALLUMS, CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS § 4:2 (2012); Marc E. Babej, Forrester: 
U.S. E-Commerce to Rise 13% This Year, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2013, 12:36 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcbabej/2013/03/13/forrester-u-s-e-commerce 
-to-rise-13-this-year/ [https://perma.cc/K5Y3-ENNJ]. Internet sales are pro-
jected to reach $370 billion in 2017. Id. Two main drivers of growth are pur-
ported to be (1) increased investment by brick-and-mortar establishments in 
their e-commerce divisions; and (2) increased time spent online, due to the 
predominance of tablets and smartphones. Id. (noting that more than half of 
online consumers own such devices and use them to “research products, com-
pare prices, and make purchases.”). 
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Despite the limitations imposed on state tax jurisdiction by the 
Due Process and Commerce Clause, and despite the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Quill, the rise of e-commerce has prompted 
states to expand their nexus statutes to account for lost tax rev-
enue on purchases from out-of-state (remote) retailers who lack 
the obligation to collect and remit states’ sales and use tax.48 
This is understandable since, in today’s modern economy, many 
businesses solely have a virtual presence, or have in-state physi-
cal presence (such as an office, or employees) in a minority of 
states.49 Because, on average, approximately 31.3 percent of a 
state’s sales tax revenue comes from the collection of sales and 
use taxes,50 Quill’s bright-line “physical presence” rule has ac-
counted for millions, if not billions, in lost sales tax revenue.51  
A prime example of an aggressive nexus statute is New York’s 
“Amazon Tax.”52 Essentially, New York’s law attempts to satisfy 
                                                                                                            
48 HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 12–13. 
49 Id.  
50 CHERYL LEE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, G14-STC, STATE GOVERNMENT 
TAX COLLECTIONS SUMMARY REPORT: 2014 at 1, http://www2.census.gov/govs 
/statetax/G14-STC-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/93WD-EXKE]. According to the 
Census Bureau’s latest data, the leading source of state tax revenue is indi-
vidual income tax, at 35.9 percent; sales tax, however, is a close second, at 
31.3 percent. Id. Together, sales tax and individual income tax account for 
two-thirds of total tax revenue. Id. The reliance on sales tax revenue is even 
starker when viewed on a state-by-state basis. For example, in 2014, Tennessee 
derived approximately 79.6 percent of its tax revenue from the collection of 
sales tax. Id. at 7. The rate for Texas, a state without a state income tax, is 
even higher (84 percent). Id. 
51 States are in a bind because they cannot require remote retailers to col-
lect their sales tax and because use tax compliance is so low; “California, for 
example, has estimated that it is able to collect only about 4% of the use taxes 
due on sales from out-of-state vendors.” Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. 
Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (citing CALIF. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION, REVENUE 
ESTIMATE (REV. 8/13), ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND MAIL ORDER SALES 7 
(2013), https://www.boe.ca.gov/legdiv/pdf/e-commerce-08-21-13F.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/ATK5-TRQV] (Table 3)); HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 7–8. 
52 Kenneth Corbin, New York’s About-Face on E-Commerce Taxation, 
INTERNETNEWS.COM (Nov. 14, 2007), http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news 
/%20article.php/3711236 [https://perma.cc/YR8N-T246]. Former Governor Eliot 
Spitzer proposed the “Amazon Tax” in November 2007, which required com-
pliance by online retailers beginning December 7, 2007; however, Spitzer 
quickly rescinded the new tax policy. Id. While Spitzer did not comment on 
whether potential legal challenges to the tax influenced his decision, it is 
likely that Spitzer viewed the policy as “overreaching,” and “afoul of the 1992 
U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Quill Corporation v. North Dakota.” Id. The tax 
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the substantial nexus requirement by expanding the definition 
of sales solicitation to include a remote retailer who “enters into 
an agreement with a resident of [New York] under which the resi-
dent, for a commission or other consideration, directly or indirectly 
refers potential customers, whether by a link on an internet 
website or otherwise, to the seller,”53 provided that such refer-
rals result in over $10,000 in sales per year.54 Thus, although 
Amazon had no physical presence in New York,55 Amazon was re-
quired to collect and remit New York sales tax based on its market-
ing affiliates located in New York.56 Because Internet retailers 
have a “virtual presence”57 that goes beyond state borders, New 
York’s law is applicable “both to retailers that target sales to 
New York residents and to retailers who sell generally to every-
one on the internet, and may or may not end up selling to New 
Yorkers.”58 The result, therefore, is a presumption that the remote 
Internet retailer solicited sales from a resident in the taxing 
state and thus satisfied the nexus requirement.59 This presump-
tion is rebuttable, however, if the retailer can prove that “the resi-
dent with whom [he] has an agreement did not engage in any 
solicitation in the state on behalf of the [retailer].”60 
Undoubtedly, New York’s “Amazon Tax” runs afoul of Quill’s 
bright-line physical presence rule.61 Yet, this did not stop at 
least sixteen additional states from also “turn[ing] a hungry eye to 
                                                                                                            
was later reconsidered and approved by the New York State Assembly on 
April 9, 2008, and took effect on June 1, 2008. Cowan, infra note 56, at 1426. 
53 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney 2010). 
54 HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 11. 
55 Barnes, infra note 78 (Amazon’s headquarters are located in Seattle, 
Washington).  
56 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi); see also Daniel Tyler Cowan, New York’s 
Unconstitutional Tax on the Internet: Amazon.com v. New York State De-
partment of Taxation & Finance and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 N.C. 
L. REV. 1423, 1429 (2010). 
57 Cowan, supra note 56, at 1428. 
58 HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 11. 
59 Id.; see also Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. St. Dep’t of Tax’n and Fin., 987 
N.E.2d 621, 627 (N.Y. 2013) (reasoning that “it is not unreasonable to pre-
sume that affiliated website owners residing in New York State will reach out 
to their New York friends, relatives and other local individuals in order to 
accomplish this purpose.”).  
60 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi). 
61 HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 11. 
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the thriving e-commerce market”62 and enacting “click-through,” 
“affiliate,”63 and comparable nexus statutes.64 For example, North 
Carolina,65 Rhode Island,66 Arkansas,67 Vermont,68 California,69 
Georgia,70 Maine,71 and Minnesota72 have all enacted New York– 
inspired nexus statutes, containing both rebuttable presumption 
language and a threshold sales amount.73 Other states, such as 
Connecticut,74 Illinois,75 and Texas,76 have pushed the nexus 
boundaries even further by enacting statutes with an irrefutable 
solicitation presumption.77 Despite the constitutionality concerns 
raised by New York’s “Amazon Tax” and other “click-through” or 
“affiliate” nexus statues, the Supreme Court has declined to 
weigh in on the issue.78 
                                                                                                            
62 Corbin, supra note 52. 
63 HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 12. 
64 Cowan, supra note 56, at 1429. 
65 See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-164.8(b)(3) (West 2009). 
66 See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-18-15(a)(2) (West 2016). 
67 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-52-110(d)–(e) (2013) (noting that this statute 
was formerly located at § 26-52-117; the Arkansas Code Revision Commission 
renumbered this section in order to preserve the integrity of the numbering 
scheme of the subchapter). 
68 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 9783(b)–(c) (West 2016). 
69 See CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 6203(c)(5) (West 2012). 
70 See GA. CODE ANN. § 48-8-2(8)(M) (West 2016). 
71 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1754-B(1-A)(C) (West 2014). 
72 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 297A.66(4a) (West 2014). 
73 HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 12–13. 
74 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-407(a)(12)(L) (West 2016). 
75 See 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/2 (West 2015); id. 110/2 (under “Re-
tailer maintaining a place of business in this State,” § 1.1; and “Serviceman 
maintaining a place of business in this State,” § 1.1, respectively). 
76 See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.107(a)(3), (a)(8) (West 2012).  
77 HENCHMAN, supra note 25, at 13. 
78 Korey Clark, Supreme Court Refuses to Hear New York Amazon Tax 
Case, LEGAL NEWSROOM (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom 
/commercial/b/contracts-commercial-law/archive/2013/12/09/supreme-court-re 
fuses-to-hear-new-york-amazon-tax-case.aspx [https://perma.cc/ELQ6-MNGN]; 
see also Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. St. Dep’t of Tax’n and Fin., 987 N.E.2d 
621, 621 (N.Y. 2013); Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. St. Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., 913 
N.Y.S.2d 129 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). On December 2, 2013, the U.S. Supreme 
Court denied petitions for certiorari from Amazon.com and Overstock.com to 
review a New York Court of Appeals judgment upholding the “Amazon Tax.” 
Clark, supra. While some view the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial as approval 
of New York’s “Amazon Tax,” “to treat both online and brick-and-mortar retailers 
equally and fairly,” others see “[t]he failure of the [C]ourt to take … [the] case … 
[as] an additional burden on interstate commerce since the line between physical 
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III. THE MARKETPLACE FAIRNESS ACT 
A. Overview 
On November 9, 2011, the MFA was first introduced in the 
Senate to restore the states’ “sovereign rights to enforce State 
and local sales and use tax laws.”79 The bill does so by granting 
states the authority to require all sellers exceeding $500,00080 in 
total U.S. “remote sales,” to collect and remit the sales and use 
tax of the states to which the sales were “sourced.”81 As defined in 
the MFA, a “remote sale,” is “a sale of goods or services attributed 
to a State with respect to which a seller does not have adequate 
physical presence to establish a nexus under Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992),”82 and the term “sourced,” refers to 
“the location where the item sold is received by the purchaser, 
based on the location indicated by instructions for delivery that 
the purchaser furnishes to the seller.”83 To illustrate, assume that 
a New York retailer, who lacks physical presence in Pennsylvania, 
sells a computer to a customer in Pennsylvania, who receives the 
computer in Pennsylvania. Under the MFA, which explicitly 
defies Quill’s bright-line physical presence rule, Pennsylvania is 
authorized to compel the New York retailer to collect and remit 
                                                                                                            
and virtual presence will only continue to blur.” Id. (quoting N.Y. State Attorney 
General Eric T. Schneiderman and David C. Blum, Chicago tax attorney). 
Overstock responded to the Court’s denial by suspending its relationship with 
its New York affiliates so that it would not fall prey to the New York law. 
Robert Barnes, Supreme Court declines case on making online retailers collect 




79 Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 1832, 112th Cong. (2011), https://www.gov 
track.us/congress/bills/112/s1832/text [https://perma.cc/MSV4-R87K] (the bill 
was sponsored by Michael Enzi (R-WY)). 
80 This is known as the “small seller exception.” Id. § 2(c); see also infra 
Part IV.A.3.b. 
81 S. 1832 § 2(c). The MFA treats “similar sales transactions equally, with-
out regard to the manner in which the sale is transacted.” Id. § 2.  
82 Id. § 6(5). The Supreme Court in Quill, which is still good law today, es-
tablished that a State “may not require retailers who lack a physical presence 
in the State to collect use taxes on behalf of the [State].” Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. 
Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1127 (2015) (citing Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 
298, 315–18 (2002)). 
83 S. 1832 § 6(8). 
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the Pennsylvania sales and use tax arising from the remote sale.84 
If perhaps, the customer lived in Pennsylvania but instructed 
that the computer be delivered to his Connecticut home, under 
the MFA, Connecticut would be authorized to compel the New 
York retailer to collect and remit the applicable Connecticut 
sales and use tax.85 
The MFA imposes two limitations on states wishing to force 
the collection and remittance of their sales and use taxes.86 
First, states must agree to simplify, or streamline, their sales and 
use tax laws.87 Second, sellers qualifying for the “small seller 
exception” are exempt from the MFA and therefore beyond the 
reach of the states.88 
States wishing to streamline can do so in two ways. For one, 
they can adopt the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement 
(SSUTA).89 The purpose of the SSUTA is to simplify sales and 
use tax administration, and thereby reduce the burden of tax 
compliance,90 by essentially making the tax administration pro-
tocols identical in member states.91 SSUTA purports to do this 
in the following ways: 
                                                                                                            
84 See Peter G. Stathopoulos, State Taxation of Remote Sellers: Has the 
Physical Presence Nexus Test been Rendered Obsolete?, J. MULTIST. TAX’N & 
INCENTIVES, Aug. 2013, at 24, 24–25. 
85 See generally Dion, supra note 17; BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20, 
§ 4.38. 
86 See BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20, § 4.38. 
87 See Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 1832, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011). 
88 Id. § 3(c).  
89 See What Is the Marketplace Fairness Act?, supra note 20; STREAMLINED 
SALES & USE TAX AGREEMENT § 102 (STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING 
BD., INC. 2015), http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/uploads/downloads/Archive 
/SSUTA/SSUTA%20As%20Amended%20through%209-17-15.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/BT2J-EHM3]. The SSUTA was adopted on November 12, 2002. Currently, 23 
states are full members, while 1 state is an associate member. Full member 
status is achieved when a state is in full compliance with the laws, rules, 
regulations, and policies outlined in the SSUTA. Associate member status is 
achieved when a state is in substantial compliance with the SSUTA as a whole, 
but not necessarily with each provision. State Info: Streamline Sales Tax State 
Members, STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., INC., http://www.stream 
linedsales-tax.org/index.php?page=state-info [https://perma.cc/H4KJ-Q4NN]. 
90 STREAMLINED SALES & USE TAX AGREEMENT, supra note 89, § 102. 
91 Streamlined Sales and Use Tax, SALESTAXSUPPORT.COM (2016), http:// 
www.salestaxsupport.com/sales-tax-information/streamlined-sales-tax-sst/ 
[https://perma.cc/KE4B-H4B4]. 
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State level administration of sales and use tax collections; uni-
formity in the state and local tax bases; uniformity of major 
tax base definitions; central, electronic registration system for 
all member states; simplification of state and local tax rates; 
uniform sourcing rules for all taxable transactions; simplified 
administration of exemptions; simplified tax returns; simplifi-
cation of tax remittances; protection of consumer privacy.92 
Secondly, states wishing to avoid membership in the SSUTA 
may still require remote sellers to collect and remit their sales 
and use taxes if they implement certain minimum simplification 
requirements.93 Such states must: 
(A) Provide—(i) a single State-level agency to administer all 
sales and use tax laws, including the collection and admin-
istration of all State and applicable locality sales and use taxes 
for all sales sourced to the State made by remote sellers, (ii) a 
single audit for all State and local taxing jurisdictions within 
that State, and (iii) a single sales and use tax return to be used 
by remote sellers and single and consolidated providers and to 
be filed with the State-level agency. 
(B) Provide a uniform sales and use tax base among the State 
and the local taxing jurisdictions within the State. 
(C) Require remote sellers and single and consolidated pro-
viders to collect sales and use taxes pursuant to the applicable 
destination rate, which is the sum of the applicable State rate and 
any applicable rate for the local jurisdiction into which the sale 
is made. 
(D) Provide—(i) adequate software and services to remote sellers 
and single and consolidated providers that identifies the applica-
ble destination rate, including the State and local sales tax rate (if 
any), to be applied on sales sourced to the State, and (ii) certifica-
tion procedures for both single providers and consolidated provid-
ers to make software and services available to remote sellers, 
and hold such providers harmless for any errors or omissions as 
a result of relying on information provided by the State. 
(E) Hold remote sellers using a single or consolidated pro-
vider harmless for any errors and omissions by that provider. 
(F) Relieve remote sellers from liability to the State or locality 
for collection of the incorrect amount of sales or use tax, includ-
ing any penalties or interest, if collection of the improper amount 
is the result of relying on information provided by the State. 
                                                                                                            
92 STREAMLINED SALES & USE TAX AGREEMENT, supra note 89, § 102. 
93 Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 1832, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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(G) Provide remote sellers and single and consolidated providers 
with 30 days notice of a rate change by any locality in the State.94 
Under the MFA’s “small seller exception,” remote sellers hav-
ing “gross annual receipts” of $500,000 or less, in “total remote 
sales in the United States,” are exempt from the bill.95 In deter-
mining whether this threshold has been met, “gross annual re-
ceipts” refers to the total amount the seller receives from “all 
sources during its annual accounting period, without subtracting 
any costs or expenses;”96 furthermore, the sales of sellers “related” 
within the meaning of Internal Revenue Code § 267(b) and (c),97 
or § 707(b)(1),98 are to be aggregated.99 
Although the MFA expired at the end of the 112th Congress 
without being enacted,100 the Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015 
(MFA of 2015), a nearly identical bill, was introduced to the Senate 
                                                                                                            
94 Id. 
95 Id. (emphasis added). 
96 Raul Avenir, What are Gross Receipts?, ARIZ. CENTRAL: YOUR BUSINESS, 
http://yourbusiness.azcentral.com/gross-receipts-8325.html [https://perma.cc 
/98PV-L6TV]; Gross Receipts Defined, IRS (Nov. 6, 2012), https://www.irs.gov 
/charities-non-profits/gross-receipts-defined [https://perma.cc/K8CM-Y48W]. 
97 Related persons under sections 267(b) and (c) include: members of a 
family (whole or half blood brothers and sisters, spouses, ancestors, and lineal de-
scendants); a corporation and an individual who, either directly or indirectly, owns 
more than 50 percent of such corporation’s outstanding stock; a parent corporation 
and its subsidiary; a fiduciary and grantor of a trust; fiduciaries of two different 
trusts, if the same person serves as grantor of both trusts; a fiduciary and benefi-
ciary of a trust; a fiduciary and beneficiary of different trusts, if the same person 
serves as grantor of both trusts; a fiduciary of a trust and a corporation, if the fidu-
ciary owns, either directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of the corporation’s 
outstanding stock; a partnership and a corporation if the same person owns 
more than 50 percent of the corporation’s outstanding stock, and more than 50 
percent of the partnership’s capital or profits interests; two S corporations if 
the same person owns more than 50 percent of each S corporation’s outstand-
ing stock; and a C corporation and an S corporation, if the same person owns 
more than 50 percent of each corporation’s stock. I.R.C. § 267(b)–(c) (2016). 
98 Related persons under section 707(b)(1) include “a partnership and a 
person owning, directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of the capital interest, 
or the profits interest, in such partnership,” and “two partnerships in which 
the same persons own, directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of the capital 
interests or profits interests.” I.R.C. § 707(b)(1) (2012). 
99 Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 1832, 112th Cong. § 3(c) (2011). 
100 See BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20, § 4.38. 
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on March 10, 2015.101 The starkest difference between the MFA 
and the MFA of 2015 lies in its “small seller exception.”102 While the 
MFA exempts remote sellers with gross annual receipts of $500,000 
or less in total remote sales, the MFA of 2015 increased this thresh-
old to $1,000,000 or less.103 That is, under the MFA of 2015, states 
can only require remote sellers to collect and remit their sales and 
use taxes if “the remote seller has gross annual receipts in total 
remote sales in the United States ... exceeding $1,000,000.”104 
Proponents of the MFA allege that the bill will help “level the 
playing field” between remote, online sellers and local “brick and 
mortar establishments,” by requiring the former to charge sales 
tax on their goods.105 The argument goes as such: local store owners 
are disadvantaged in that they are forced to charge sales tax on 
their goods, while remote, online sellers can effectively bypass taxa-
tion by showing a lack of physical presence in the taxing state.106 
Because sales tax is not a factor in their profit calculations, remote, 
online sellers are able to offer goods at a lower effective price, 
which, proponents claim, gives them a more competitive edge and 
takes a toll on the taxing state’s finances and retail job market.107 
Opponents of the MFA argue that “compel[ling] online and 
catalog retailers (‘remote sellers’), no matter where they are 
                                                                                                            
101 See Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 2(b)(2)(D)(ii) 
(2015). The MFA of 2015 was sponsored by Michael Enzi (R-WY), and is the most 
recent version of the bill. Id. (The MFA of 2015 is nearly identical to the original 
MFA, with its revised small seller threshold as its starkest difference.) The 
MFA of 2015 clarifies that nonmember SSUTA states must provide software to 
remote sellers that calculates the “sales and use taxes due on each transaction at 
the time the transaction is completed,” “free of charge.” Id. (emphasis added). 
102 Compare Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 1832 § 2(c), with Marketplace 
Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698 § 2(c). The MFA of 2015 now exempts remote 
sellers with gross annual receipts under $1,000,000, while the original MFA 
exempted sellers with gross annual receipts under $500,000. Id. 
103 Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698 § 2(c). This “small seller ex-
ception” is likely to be removed in future drafts of the bill because, according 
to U.S. Rep. Goodlatte, “laws should be so simple and compliance so inexpensive 
and reliable as to render a small business exemption unnecessary.” HENCHMAN, 
supra note 25, at 17. 
104 Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698 § 2(c). 
105 BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20, § 4:38. 
106 See id. 
107 See Stathopoulos, supra note 84, at 26–27. For example, consumers of-
ten use brick and mortar retailers as product “showrooms,” to gauge prices 
before ultimately purchasing the desired product from an online, remote re-
tailer, such as Amazon.com. Id.  
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located, to collect sales tax at the time of a transaction,”108 regard-
less of physical presence, amounts to “taxation without represen-
tation”109 and unduly burdens interstate commerce.110 Complete 
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady asserts that, in order for a tax to 
survive a “negative” Commerce Clause challenge, it must be 
“fairly related to the services provided by the state.”111 Thus, op-
ponents argue that forcing online, remote sellers to collect and 
remit sales taxes, even though they receive no benefit from the 
collection and have no voice in how the tax revenue is spent,112 
amounts to a Commerce Clause violation. 
IV. DUE PROCESS AND COMMERCE CLAUSE CONCERNS 
RAISED BY THE MFA OF 2015 
A. Due Process and Commerce Clause Analysis via Quill 
1. Quill, An Overview 
Quill was a mail-order Delaware corporation that sold office 
equipment and supplies.113 Quill had offices and warehouses in 
only three states (Illinois, California, and Georgia) but solicited 
                                                                                                            
108 What Is the Marketplace Fairness Act?, supra note 20. 
109 BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20, § 4:38; see also Cassandra Carroll, 
Marketplace Fairness Act Would Cripple Small Businesses, AMS. FOR TAX 
REFORM (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.atr.org/marketplace-fairness-act-would 
-cripple-small-businesses [http://perma.cc/EH5D-KLXZ]. This argues that the 
MFA of 2013 sets a troubling example in granting states taxing power over 
non-constituents: “Their ultimate goal is to export their tax and regulatory bur-
den to Americans who have no recourse at the ballot box. A politician’s dream 
come true.” Carroll, supra, at 2 (quoting Katie McAuliffe, FORBES: CAPITAL 
FLOWS (Sept. 4, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/09/04 
/amazon-can-support-the-internet-sales-tax-because-amazon-is-exempt/#3717a1 
c5ffb0 [https://perma.cc/RN64-ZSE2]). 
110 See Stathopoulos, supra note 84, at 27–46. 
111 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977); see also 
Rick Handel, A Conceptual Analysis of Nexus in State and Local Taxation, 67 
TAX LAW. 623, 628 (2014). 
112 BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20, § 4:38. Unlike remote, online re-
tailers, local brick and mortar establishments directly benefit from the sales 
tax revenue they are forced to collect and remit to the taxing state. For ex-
ample, in exchange for sales tax revenue, the state provides brick and mortar 
establishments with better fire and police protection, better-maintained 
roads, and better-maintained public transportation systems, giving customers 
greater access to these stores. Stathopoulos, supra note 84, at 27–46. 
113 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 302 (1992). 
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business from across the country via catalogues, flyers, advertise-
ments in national periodicals and direct telemarketing.114 Quill’s 
annual national sales exceeded $200 million, approximately $1 
million of which came directly from sales to 3,000 North Dakota 
customers.115 Quill had neither offices, nor warehouses, nor em-
ployees who worked or lived in North Dakota, and delivered its 
products to North Dakota via mail or common carriers from out-
of-state locations.116 Yet, despite its lack of physical presence, North 
Dakota attempted to compel Quill, through a cleverly worded nexus 
statute,117 to collect and pay its use tax on goods purchased for 
use within North Dakota.118 Quill challenged North Dakota’s stat-
ute on Due Process and Commerce Clause grounds, arguing that, 
since it lacked physical presence in North Dakota, it could not be 
required to serve as North Dakota’s “collection agent.”119 
The trial court ruled for Quill, finding the case indistinguish-
able from National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue 
Illinois.120 In Bellas Hess, the Supreme Court held that a “seller 
whose only connection with customers in the [taxing] State is by 
common carrier or the United States mail”121 lacks the “substantial 
nexus” required by the Commerce Clause, and therefore cannot 
                                                                                                            
114 Id.  
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 North Dakota amended its statutory definition of “retailer” in 1987 to 
broadly include “every person who engaged in regular or systematic solicitation of 
a consumer market in the state;” “regular or systematic solicitation” means 
“three or more advertisements within a 12-month period.” Id. at 302–03 (em-
phases added). According to the statute, all “retailers” were required to collect 
and remit North Dakota’s use tax, “even if they maintain[ed] no property or 
personnel in North Dakota.” Id. 
118 Id. at 301. 
119 Id. at 303. 
120 Id. See Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 
(1967). Like Quill in North Dakota, National Bellas Hess was a mail-order 
company that solicited business from Illinois customers. Although it lacked 
physical presence in Illinois—it had no place of business, no sales representa-
tives, and no real or personal property there—Illinois required that National 
Bellas Hess collect and pay its use tax on purchases made to Illinois custom-
ers. The Supreme Court ruled for National Bellas Hess, finding that a “seller 
whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or 
the United States mail” lacks the “substantial nexus” required by the Com-
merce Clause. Id. at 758. 
121 Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758. 
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be compelled to collect such state’s use taxes.122 Similarly, the 
trial court in Quill concluded that, since North Dakota failed to 
show that its tax revenue was spent—at least in part—to benefit 
mail-order businesses, there was no “nexus to allow the state to 
define retailer in the manner it chose.”123 
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed on two grounds. 
First, it concluded that, because of the “wholesale changes” in 
the economy—most notably, the exponential growth of mail-order 
businesses “from a relatively inconsequential market niche [in 
1967] ... [to] a goliath” with annual sales that reached “the stagger-
ing figure of $183.3 billion in 1989”124—Bellas Hess was outdated 
and was no longer appropriate to follow.125 Second, because Quill’s 
“economic presence” in North Dakota depended on North Dakota’s 
services and benefits, a “constitutionally sufficient nexus” had 
been created, which justified the “imposition of the purely ad-
ministrative duty of collecting and remitting the use tax.”126 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed.127 
2. The Varying Due Process and Commerce Clause Inquiries 
and Nexus Statutes 
Although “closely related,”128 the Due Process Clause and the 
Commerce Clause differ in several ways.129 First, they each pose 
distinct limits on states’ taxing powers. Second, they each call 
for different nexus requirements. Third, Congress may only au-
thorize violations of the Commerce Clause, not violations of the 
Due Process Clause.130 
                                                                                                            
122 Quill, 504 U.S. at 311. 
123 Id. at 303. 
124 State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 208–09, 213 
(N.D. 1991). 
125 Quill, 504 U.S. at 303. 
126 Id. at 304 (quoting Quill, 470 N.W.2d at 219). 
127 Id. at 319. 
128 Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967). 
129 Quill, 504 U.S. at 305–06; see also Int’l Harvester Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury of 
Ind., 322 U.S. 340, 353 (1944) (“‘Due process’ and ‘commerce clause’ concep-
tions are not always sharply separable .... To some extent they overlap .... 
But, though overlapping, the two conceptions are not identical. There may be 
more than sufficient factual connections ... between the transaction and the 
taxing state to sustain the tax as against due process objections. Yet it may 
fall because of its burdening effect upon the commerce.”). 
130 Quill, 504 U.S. at 305. 
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The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
states from depriving citizens of “life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law.”131 For state tax purposes, this requires 
that there be “some definite link, some minimum connection, 
between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks 
to tax,”132 and that the “income attributed to the State for tax 
purposes ... be rationally related to the ‘values connected with 
the taxing State.’”133 Similar to adjudicative jurisdiction Due 
Process inquiries,134 state tax jurisdiction Due Process inquiries 
focus on an individual’s contacts with the taxing state and en-
sure that they are substantial enough not to “offend traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”135 
Since Due Process analysis hinges on the “fundamental fair-
ness of governmental activity,”136 its nexus standard, justifiably, 
calls for “notice” or “fair warning,” rather than physical pres-
ence.137 Thus, a remote seller who “purposefully avails itself” of 
the benefits of a state’s economic market may very well subject 
itself to that state’s in personam jurisdiction, despite the seller’s 
lack of physical presence there.138 Based on this reasoning, the 
Supreme Court rejected Quill’s Due Process Clause challenge; 
despite Quill’s lack of physical presence in North Dakota, Quill’s 
commercial efforts were “continuous and widespread,” and “pur-
posefully directed” towards North Dakotans,139 which gave Quill 
                                                                                                            
131 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
132 Quill, 504 U.S. at 306 (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 
340, 344–45 (1954)). 
133 Quill, 504 U.S. at 306 (quoting Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 
273 (1978)) (emphasis added). 
134 Michael T. Fatale, The Evolution of Due Process and State Tax Juris-
diction, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 565, 595 (2015). 
135 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Quill, 504 U.S. at 307 
(“All assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the 
standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.”). 
136 Quill, 504 U.S. at 312. 
137 Id.  
138 Id. at 307–08 (“Jurisdiction ... may not be avoided merely because the 
defendant did not physically enter the forum State .... [I]t is an inescapable 
fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is trans-
acted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines ....”) (quoting 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)). 
139 Id. at 308. Quill mailed twenty-four tons of catalogues and flyers into 
North Dakota every year. State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 
203, 218–19 (N.D. 1991).  
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“fair warning” that it may be subject to North Dakota’s jurisdic-
tion and forced to serve as its “collection agent.”140 
The Commerce Clause expressly grants Congress the authority 
“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”141 Congress may 
either choose to regulate, “thereby preempting the states from 
doing so ... or to authorize the states to regulate.”142 But what 
happens when Congress remains silent, “neither preempting nor 
consenting to state regulation,” and a state undertakes to regu-
late amidst Congress’s silence?143 According to the Supreme Court, 
the Commerce Clause’s “negative sweep” implicitly limits the power 
of state and local governments by prohibiting regulations that 
discriminate against and unduly burden interstate commerce.144 
For a tax to survive a “negative” Commerce Clause challenge, 
it must: (1) be “applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with 
the taxing State”; (2) be “fairly apportioned”; (3) “not discriminate 
against interstate commerce”; and (4) be “fairly related to the ser-
vices provided by the State.”145 This four-part test, derived by the 
Supreme Court in Complete Auto,146 helps to curb state taxing 
power by prohibiting “economic protectionism” or state tax laws 
designed to benefit a state’s inside economy (non-remote sellers) by 
burdening its outside competitors (remote sellers).147 Thus, unlike 
Due Process analysis, which focuses on the “fundamental fairness 
of governmental activity,” Commerce Clause analysis focuses on 
the “effects of state regulation on the national economy.”148 
Because the inquiries are different, the Commerce Clause’s 
“‘substantial nexus’ requirement is not, like Due Process’ ‘minimum 
                                                                                                            
140 Quill, 504 U.S. at 308.  
141 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Weyl, supra note 2, at 258. 
142 Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1135 (10th Cir. 2016). 
143 Id. 
144 Quill, 504 U.S. at 309 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)). As 
suggested by Justice Johnson in Ogden, “the Commerce Clause is more than 
an affirmative grant of power[.]” Id. The “negative” or “dormant” aspect of the 
Commerce Clause is not explicitly stated in the Constitution—“[the Constitu-
tion] says nothing about the protection of interstate commerce in the absence 
of any action by Congress”—but is derived directly from Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 3. Id. 
145 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977); Handel, 
supra note 111, at 628. 
146 Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279. 
147 Brohl, 814 F.3d at 1135. 
148 Quill, 504 U.S. at 312. 
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contacts’ requirement, a proxy for notice, but rather a means for 
limiting state burdens on interstate commerce.”149 
3. Due Process and Commerce Clause Concerns 
In essence, the MFA of 2015 legislatively “overrules” Quill by 
replacing the “physical presence” requirement of “substantial nexus” 
with one of “economic nexus.”150 That is, a remote seller who 
incurs gross annual receipts in total remote U.S. sales exceeding 
$1,000,000151 is presumed to have a “substantial nexus” with all 
states to which a remote sale is sourced, despite the seller’s lack 
of physical presence in these states.152 Because the MFA of 2015 
purports not to “create any nexus or alter the standards for de-
termining nexus between a person and a State or locality,”153 the 
rationale of the bill hinges on the idea that “economic nexus” is 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause 
and Commerce Clause, namely “fair warning” and “substantial 
nexus.”154 However, Quill and McIntyre stand for the contrary.155 
While a mere high volume of sales may mitigate Due Process con-
cerns, it does not similarly mitigate Commerce Clause concerns.156 
As iterated in Quill, for a seller to have a “substantial nexus” 
with the taxing state, the seller must have a “physical presence” 
there, such as the existence of employees or property;157 “eco-
nomic nexus” alone is insufficient.158 Thus, although when taken 
                                                                                                            
149 Id. at 313. 
150 James G.S. Yang, Synchronizing the Concepts of Physical Presence and 
Economic Nexus under the Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013, 17 6 J. INTERNET L. 
21, 28 (2013).  
151 Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 2(c) (2015).  
152 Id. § 2(a). 
153 Id. § 3(b). 
154 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 312. 
155 Id. at 312–13. 
156 Id. at 308. 
157 Id. at 301–02, 312–13. “Physical presence” in the taxing state does not 
include the advertisements, flyers, or catalogues. Id. 
158 Id. Quill Corp. lacked a “substantial nexus” with North Dakota despite 
the fact that it sent 24 tons of catalogs and flyers into the State and solicited 
approximately $1,000,000 in sales from 3,000 North Dakota residents each 
year. Id. at 302, 304. This is because Bellas Hess created a safe harbor for sellers 
“whose only connection with customers in the [taxing] State is by common 
carrier or the United States mail,” freeing them “from state-imposed duties to 
collect sales and use taxes.” Id. at 315 (quoting Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of 
Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967)). 
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at face value the MFA of 2015 purports not to create or alter the 
sales and use tax nexus standards,159 it seemingly does exactly 
what it purports not to do. Any other interpretation of the bill 
would be inconsistent; since the bill only applies to remote 
sellers,160 it is impossible for it to be effective without creating 
nexus where it did not previously “legally” exist. 
a. Due Process Analysis via McIntyre 
Although a personal jurisdiction case, McIntyre161 is relevant to 
state tax jurisdiction inquiries because “the state tax and adjudica-
tive jurisdiction due process inquiries are ‘comparable.’”162 Further, 
the constitutional limitations applicable to state tax jurisdiction 
derive predominantly from the Due Process Clause.163 
McIntyre concerned a New Jersey resident, Nicastro, who was 
injured while using a metal-shearing machine manufactured by J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. (J. McIntyre), a foreign company in-
corporated in England.164 The injury occurred in New Jersey and 
Nicastro sued in New Jersey, claiming that J. McIntyre was 
subject to New Jersey’s jurisdiction for three reasons: (1) a U.S. 
distributor agreed to sell J. McIntyre’s machines in the United 
States; (2) J. McIntyre officials attended trade shows in several 
states, although not in New Jersey; and (3) at most four of J. 
McIntyre’s machines, including the one that allegedly injured 
Nicastro, ended up in New Jersey.165 Invoking Justice Brennan’s 
“stream-of-commerce” test, the New Jersey Supreme Court held 
that New Jersey may exercise jurisdiction over J. McIntyre, a 
foreign manufacturer, without offending the Due Process Clause 
so long as J. McIntyre “knew or reasonably should have known” 
                                                                                                            
159 Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 3(b) (2015) 
(emphasis added). 
160 Id. § 2(a). “The provisions of this Act shall apply only to remote sales 
and shall not apply to intrastate sales or intrastate sourcing rules.” Id. § 3(f) 
(emphasis added). 
161 See generally J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
162 Fatale, supra note 134, at 595. McIntyre, which concerns “specific” ra-
ther than “general” adjudicative jurisdiction, is particularly relevant to state 
tax inquiry since state tax cases consider questions of specific jurisdiction. Id. 
at 568. 
163 Id. at 595. 
164 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 878. 
165 Id.; Fatale, supra note 134, at 608–09. 
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that its products would be distributed through a national distri-
bution system, resulting in potential sales in any of the fifty 
states.166 Finding that J. McIntyre neither had a presence nor 
minimum contacts in New Jersey, the Supreme Court reversed.167 
Justice Kennedy, writing for four of the Justices, held that in 
order for a remote seller to be subject to New Jersey’s jurisdic-
tion, the seller must have “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus 
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”168 Because J. 
McIntyre “had no office in New Jersey; it neither paid taxes nor 
owned property there; and it neither advertised in, nor sent any 
employees to, the State,”169 Justice Kennedy reasoned that J. 
McIntyre had not “purposefully avail[ed] itself” of New Jersey, 
and, thus, could not be subject to New Jersey’s jurisdiction.170 
Justice Breyer, writing for himself and Justice Alito, agreed 
with the outcome of the case, but disagreed with Justice Kennedy’s 
analysis.171 Appealing to the Court’s prior precedents, Justice 
Breyer applied a fairness test, concluding that it would be unfair 
to submit J. McIntyre to New Jersey’s jurisdiction, since J. 
McIntyre did not have a “single contact with New Jersey short of 
the machine in question ending up in this state.”172 To quote Justice 
Breyer, “these facts do not provide contacts between [J. McIntyre] 
and the State of New Jersey constitutionally sufficient to support 
New Jersey’s assertion of jurisdiction in this case. None of our 
precedents finds that a single isolated sale, even if accompanied 
by the kind of sales effort indicated here, is sufficient.”173 
                                                                                                            
166 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 879. 
167 Id. at 886–87; Fatale, supra note 134, at 609–10. 
168 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 877 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 
253 (1958)). 
169 Id. at 886. 
170 Id. Justice Kennedy admitted that J. McIntyre’s actions “may reveal an 
intent to serve the U.S. market,” but in no way showed that “J. McIntyre 
purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey market.” Id. 
171 Id. at 893. Unlike Justice Kennedy, Justice Breyer was unwilling “to an-
nounce a rule of broad applicability without full consideration of the modern-
day consequences.” Id. at 887. Justice Breyer did not believe that McIntyre 
presented “issues arising from recent changes in commerce and communica-
tion.” Id. at 875. 
172 Id. at 886. There was no “‘regular ... flow’” of sales in New Jersey, nor 
“‘something more,’ such as special state-related design, advertising, advice, 
marketing, or anything else.” Id. at 889. 
173 Id. at 888 (emphasis added). 
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McIntyre’s holding is said to be limited in two ways. For one, 
it was a splintered decision that failed to command a majority of 
the Court.174 According to U.S. v. Marks,175 if the Justices agree 
on the outcome of a judgment, but are split as to the reasoning, 
the rule of the case is limited to the opinion in which five or more 
Justices in support of the judgment concur.176 Because Justice 
Breyer’s opinion iterated the Court’s prior precedents, that a 
“single isolated sale” is insufficient to justify “an exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction,”177 McIntyre’s precedential analysis is said to be 
limited to Justice Breyer’s concurrence.178 Secondly, McIntyre con-
cerned a foreign manufacturer who: (1) made a single sale to the 
forum state; and (2) targeted the U.S. market as a whole and not 
the markets of individual states.179 Although domestic manufac-
turers often engage in substantial “in-state marketing activity,” 
the Justices explained that McIntyre’s reasoning is not limited to 
foreign manufacturers and can be extended to domestic manu-
facturers, so long as they meet the above fact pattern.180 In the 
realm of sales tax, such fact patterns are usually of little concern 
to state tax officials since minimal tax revenue is at stake.181 
However, the implementation of the MFA of 2015 would make 
such fact patterns not only relevant, but also prevalent since it 
authorizes states to force remote sellers, incurring above 
$1,000,000 in total remote U.S. sales, to collect the sales and use 
taxes of every state to which a purchase is sourced, regardless of 
the volume of sales made to individual states and regardless of 
where the remote sellers are “physically present.”182 
                                                                                                            
174 Fatale, supra note 134, at 568, 608. 
175 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
176 Fatale, supra note 134, at 616. 
177 Robert M. Pollack, “Not of Any Particular State”: J. McIntyre Machin-
ery, Ltd. v. Nicastro and Nonspecific Purposeful Availment, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1088, 1106 (2014). 
178 Fatale, supra note 134, at 616. 
179 McIntyre, 564 U.S. 885–86; Fatale, supra note 134, at 617–18. 
180 Fatale, supra note 134, at 612, 618. Unlike brick and mortar businesses 
whose “target market” generally does not extend past the boarders of the 
states in which they are located, online sellers tend to “direct their products 
towards consumers in all U.S. jurisdictions,” and may very well make only a 
single sale to a certain jurisdiction. Bryan J. Soukup, Close The Loophole: The 
Marketplace Fairness Act and its Likely Passage, INSIDE BASIS (Fed. Bar Ass’n 
Section on Taxation), Fall 2013, at 16, 18–19. 
181 Fatale, supra note 134, at 618. 
182 Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 2(c) (2015).  
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As stated previously, Due Process requires that there be “some 
definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and 
the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax,”183 and that 
the tax dollars received by the state be “rationally related” to the 
state’s values.184 The relevant inquiry therefore, is whether the 
individual’s contacts with the state “ma[k]e it reasonable”185 for 
him to be required to submit to the state’s power and to serve as 
the state’s “collection agent.”186 Although for different reasons, both 
Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer agreed that it would be un-
reasonable for a remote seller to succumb to a state’s jurisdiction, 
if the seller’s sole contact with the state consisted of a single 
isolated sale made there.187 This view is not unique to McIntyre, 
but has been expressed by the Court in other opinions. In Asahi 
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, the Court had 
“strongly suggested that a single sale of a product in a State does 
not constitute an adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction over an 
out-of-state defendant, even if that defendant places his goods in 
the stream of commerce, fully aware (and hoping) that such a 
sale will take place.”188 That is, the Court requires “something 
more,” such as “‘the regular and anticipated flow’ of commerce 
into the State.”189 
The MFA of 2015 raises Due Process concerns in that it bases 
a remote seller’s “minimum connection” to an individual state on 
the remote seller’s “minimum connection” to the U.S. as a whole.190 
This rationale is predicated on the idea that a remote seller who 
incurs over $1,000,000 in gross annual receipts from total remote 
                                                                                                            
183 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992) (quoting Miller 
Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1954)). 
184 Id. at 306 (quoting Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978)). 
185 Id. at 298. 
186 Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756–57 (1967); see also 
Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940) (“The simple but controlling 
question is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return.”). 
187 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 888 (2011). 
188 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 888–89 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added) 
(citing Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 111–12 
(1987)). 
189 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 889 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Asahi, 480 
U.S. at 111–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 
190 Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 2(c) (2015). 
This is because the bill’s small seller threshold refers to a seller’s “total re-
mote sales in the United States,” and not to sales in any one state. Id. 
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sales191 has “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the [taxing] State[s], thus invoking the 
benefits and protections of [their] laws,”192 and thus satisfying 
the minimum connection required by the Due Process Clause.193 
However, this rationale, in failing to account for the “volume” or 
“value”194 of remote sales sourced to specific states, seemingly com-
mits the fallacy of division.195 Take, for example, a Nebraska seller 
who incurs $2,000,000 in total annual gross receipts from its remote 
sales to New York and Virginia. Specifically, it made $1,000,000 
from 100,000 sales to New York and $1,000,000 from 300,000 sales 
to Virginia. It is clear from this example that the Nebraska seller 
has “some definite link, some minimum connection”196 to both New 
York and Virginia, based on its commercial activity in these 
states, to warrant that it serve as “collection agent”197 for both 
New York and Virginia. 
But what if the facts were slightly changed and the Nebraska 
seller incurred $100 from a single sale to New York and 
$1,999,900 from 300,000 sales to Virginia? Despite McIntyre’s 
holding, that “something more” than a single sale into a state is 
needed to “constitute an adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction 
over an out-of-state [seller],”198 the MFA of 2015 would dictate 
the same result.199 Because the Nebraska seller exceeded the small 
seller threshold, it could be forced to serve as “collection agent” 
for both New York and Virginia, despite its single isolated sale of 
nominal value to New York.200 The unfairness is glaring. The 
MFA of 2015 essentially imputes the Nebraska seller’s Due Pro-
cess nexus with Virginia to New York, assuming that what is 
                                                                                                            
191 Id. 
192 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 877 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 
253 (1958)). 
193 Id. 
194 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment) (indicating that “the volume, the value, ...” of a good may affect the 
jurisdictional inquiry and emphasizing Asahi’s “regular course of dealing”). 
195 Fallacy of Division, LOGICALLY FALLACIOUS, https://www.logicallyfalla 
cious.com/tools/lp/Bo/LogicalFallacies/89/Fallacy_of_Division [https://perma.cc 
/PEJ8-6QQC].  
196 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 327 (1992) (quoting Miller 
Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1954)). 
197 Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Rev., 386 U.S. 753, 756–57 (1967). 
198 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 888–89. 
199 Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 2(c) (2015).  
200 Id. 
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true of the whole is also true of the parts,201 even though the 
Nebraska seller had not “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the priv-
ilege of conducting activities within [New York],” or enjoyed the 
“benefits and protections of [New York’s] laws.”202 Furthermore, 
this unfairness is amplified by the fact that the bill requires 
“related” remote sellers (such a parent and its subsidiary) to ag-
gregate their gross annual receipts when determining whether 
they meet the small seller exception,203 making it even more 
likely that one of the parties will lack the requisite “minimum 
connection” with the taxing state. 
b. Commerce Clause Analysis via Complete Auto 
As stated previously, the Supreme Court developed the Complete 
Auto test to determine whether a tax discriminates or unduly bur-
dens interstate commerce.204 According to the Court, for a tax to 
survive a “negative” Commerce Clause challenge, it must: (1) be ap-
plied to an activity with a “substantial nexus” with the taxing state; 
(2) be “fairly apportioned”; (3) not “discriminate against interstate 
commerce”; and (4) be “fairly related to the services provided by 
the State.”205 As iterated in Bellas Hess and reaffirmed in Quill, 
the “substantial nexus” requirement of the Commerce Clause 
requires physical presence.206 
                                                                                                            
201 See Fallacy of Division, supra note 195. The bill assumes that since the 
Nebraska seller has the requisite connection to Virginia and New York combined, 
that it has the requisite connection to both New York and Virginia separately— 
based off of the Nebraska seller’s significant commercial activity in Virginia 
and its single nominal sale to New York—this is clearly not the case. See id. 
202 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 877 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 
253 (1958)). 
203 Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 2(c); Dion, supra 
note 17. 
204 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
205 Id.; Handel, supra note 111, at 628. 
206 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311–15 (1992) (the Court decided 
Quill based on the first prong of the Complete Auto test and reaffirmed the 
holding of Bellas Hess; both Bellas Hess and the negative Commerce Clause create 
a safe harbor for “vendors whose only connection with customers in the [taxing] 
State is by common carrier or the United States mail”); Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. 
Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1150–51 (10th Cir. 2016) (explaining that the first prong of 
the negative Commerce Clause requires physical presence, the court states, “It 
is a fact—if an analytical oddity—that the Bellas Hess branch of dormant com-
merce clause jurisprudence guarantees a competitive benefit to certain firms 
simply because of the organizational form they choose to assume.”). 
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While the MFA of 2015 satisfies the second and third prongs,207 
it fails to meet the first and fourth prongs, thereby failing the 
Complete Auto test. In an attempt to “treat all sales transactions 
equally,” the MFA of 2015 grants states “collection authority”208 
over remote sellers regardless of where these sellers are physically 
located.209 Thus, the MFA of 2015 violates the first prong as it elim-
inates Quill’s bright-line “physical presence” rule and replaces it 
with “economic nexus.”210 The MFA of 2015 seemingly violates the 
fourth prong as well, since it grants states “collection authority” 
over remote sellers despite the fact that some, whether due to their 
lack of physical or economic presence,211 receive no benefit from 
the tax collection and have no voice in how the tax revenue is 
spent.212 While many modern-day remote sellers, namely online 
companies, tend to “direct their products towards consumers in 
all U.S. jurisdictions,”213 it is highly unlikely that they receive 
benefits from all fifty states in exchange for the sales and use tax 
revenue they are required to collect and remit. For example, an 
online seller who makes nominal remote sales to all 50 states ex-
ceeding the $1,000,000 threshold cannot be said to have benefitted 
                                                                                                            
207 Prong two is satisfied because “the tax will be apportioned equally through-
out each jurisdiction according to each state’s already established ... sales tax.” 
Soukup, supra note 180, at 18–19. In order for a tax to “discriminate,” it must 
treat “similarly situated” taxpayers differently, without “sufficient justification.” 
Brohl, 814 F.3d at 1143 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 435 
(1990)). Although the MFA of 2015 only applies to remote sales and has no effect 
on intrastate sales, it treats all sellers (remote or nonremote) making remote sales 
similarly. See Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 698, 114th Cong. §§ 2(a)–(b), 3(f) 
(2015). Further, the bill specifies that a state cannot require a “remote seller to file 
sales and use tax returns any more frequently than returns are required for 
nonremote sellers or impose requirements on remote sellers that the State does 
not impose on nonremote sellers.” Id. § 2(b). Thus, prong three is satisfied. 
208 Dion, supra note 17. “Collection Authority” simply refers to the state’s 
power to force the collection and remittance of its sales and use tax on pur-
chases that are sourced to it. Id. 
209 S. 698 §§ 2(a), 6(3); BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20, § 4:38. 
210 S. 698 §§ 2(a), 4(3), 4(6)–(9). The MFA of 2015 grants states “collection au-
thority” if the remote seller exceeds $1,000,000 in total remote sales. Id. § 2(c). 
211 To restate the previous example, a remote Nebraska seller who incurs over 
$1,000,000 in total gross annual receipts from a single sale to New York, 
amounting to $100, and from 300,000 sales to Virginia, amounting to $1,999,900, 
could be required to collect and remit both New York’s and Virginia’s sales and use 
tax, despite its lack of economic presence in New York. See supra Part IV.A.3.a. 
212 BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20, § 4:38. 
213 Soukup, supra note 180, at 19. 
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from each state’s fire and police protection, better-maintained 
roads, and better public-maintained transportation systems.214 
For the aforementioned reasons, the MFA of 2015 authorizes 
state actions that would unduly burden interstate commerce.215 
Yet, as iterated in Quill, Congress holds the “ultimate power” and 
discretion to do so.216 Congress has, to no avail, considered several 
pieces of legislation since Quill was decided that would ultimately 
“overrule” its bright-line rule.217 It is not unreasonable to assume 
that Congress decided against such legislation out of respect for 
the Court’s holding in Bellas Hess, “that the Due Process Clause 
prohibits States from imposing such taxes,”218 and out of respect 
for a bright-line rule in general. Although Bellas Hess’s rule “ap-
pears artificial at its edges,” predicating the collection and remit-
tance of a state’s sales and use tax on the “presence in the taxing 
State of a small sales force, plant, or office,” the benefits of a clear 
rule arguably outweigh any claims of artificiality;219 a bright-
line rule affords states a “precise guide” as to the boundaries of 
their taxing authority, reduces state tax litigation by “encour-
ag[ing] settled expectations,” and promotes investment.220 In 
fact, some attribute the exponential growth of e-commerce at 
least partly to Bellas Hess’s safe harbor.221 
Although the MFA of 2015 appears to provide a “bright-line” rule 
of its own—“economic nexus” as opposed to “physical presence”—the 
bill is riddled with ambiguities. For example, “remote seller” is 
broadly defined as “a person that makes remote sales in the 
[s]tate.”222 Since the words “online,” “internet” or “web,” are not 
                                                                                                            
214 Stathopoulos, supra note 84, at 27, 46. Contrast this with brick and mortar 
establishments who benefit directly from the tax revenue they collect and 
remit on behalf of the state. 
215 See supra notes 206–12 and accompanying text. 
216 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992). Although the 
Court reaffirmed Bellas Hess’s bright-line “physical presence” rule, it essen-
tially invited Congress to legislate: “No matter how we evaluate the burdens 
that use taxes impose on interstate commerce, Congress remains free to disagree 
with our conclusions.” Id. The Court went on to say that Congress is “better 
qualified to resolve” the issue of “whether, when, and to what extent the States 
may burden interstate [sellers] with a duty to collect use taxes.” Id. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 315. 
220 Id. at 315–16. 
221 Id. at 316. 
222 Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 4(6) (2015). 
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included in the definition,223 the bill presumably applies to more 
than just online sellers; that is, brick and mortar businesses will 
also fall under the definition.224 Similarly, the MFA of 2015 de-
fines a “remote sale” as a “sale into a State ... in which the seller 
would not legally be required to pay, collect, or remit State or local 
sales and use taxes unless provided by this Act.”225 In other words, 
it is a sale by a seller into a state with which the sellers lacks 
nexus. While the Supreme Court has defined nexus to mean “physi-
cal presence,” such as the presence of an office or employees, many 
states have aggressively expanded the Court’s rule to include a 
“web-link or banner that sits on [a company’s] website.”226 
V. ADMINISTRATIVE CONCERNS RAISED BY THE MFA 
Despite its bipartisan support,227 the MFA of 2015 has raised 
more than just Due Process and Commerce Clause concerns. For 
one, even with full-fledged adoption of the SSUTA, member 
states exhibit a significant lack of uniformity concerning their 
sales and use taxes in various areas.228 Since the MFA of 2015 
hinges on uniformity of sales and use tax laws,229 any divergence 
is detrimental to the functional success of the bill. For example, 
Georgia, a SSUTA member, passed legislation concerning resale 
exemption certificate provisions230 that contradicts the SSUTA’s 
                                                                                                            
223 Dion, supra note 17. 
224 Id. Brick and mortar businesses support the MFA in hopes that it will 
“level the playing field.” BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20, § 4:38. Yet, the 
reality is that the bill’s scope encompasses more than just online sellers. It 
grants states “collection authority” over all businesses (“such as Internet retailers 
and out-of-state vendors, catalogue-based sellers, manufacturers/wholesalers, 
B2B sellers, foreign remote sellers, and non-profit organizations”) who do not 
qualify for the small seller exception and who make remote sales. KPMG, THINK 
THE MARKETPLACE FAIRNESS ACT IS NOT YOUR REALITY? THINK AGAIN. 2 (2014). 
225 S. 698 § 4(5) (emphasis added). 
226 Dion, supra note 17. New York’s “Amazon Taxes” are a perfect example. 
See id.; see also Stathopoulos, supra note 84, at 26. 
227 Marketplace Fairness Act Compliance, TAXCLOUD, http://marketplace 
fairness.org/support/ [https://perma.cc/WA86-ZRBJ]. 
228 Stathopoulos, supra note 84, at 47. 
229 BARNES-BROWN ET AL., supra note 20, § 4:38; S. 698 § 2(b). States can 
only force remote sellers to collect and remit the applicable sales and use 
taxes if they simplify, or streamline, their sales and use taxes. Id. § 2(b)–(c). 
230 H.B. 266, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 6 (Ga. 2013) (amending GA. 
CODE ANN. § 48-8-38). 
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standard concerning these provisions.231 Although the SSUTA’s 
standard exonerates a seller from collection responsibility if the 
seller presents a valid resale exemption certificate, under Georgia’s 
new “good faith” standard, the seller is only exonerated if the 
seller exercises due diligence.232 
Secondly, the MFA of 2015 is expected to negatively impact 
small businesses (both online and brick and mortars alike) by forc-
ing them to allocate their time and resources towards compliance 
issues instead of towards job creation.233 Streamlining sales and 
use taxes is neither an easy nor inexpensive process.234 In fact, most 
large retailers employ entire teams of outside advisors dedicated 
to sales tax compliance.235 Most small businesses are already 
bogged down by “Federal and State tax systems that are too com-
plex, too time consuming, and too costly to comply with,” and simply 
cannot afford to hire outside advisors, or to implement new tax-
compliance software systems.236 Although the bill requires states to 
provide remote sellers with software, free of charge, that calculates 
the appropriate “sales and use taxes due on each transaction ... that 
files sales and use tax returns, and that is updated to reflect rate 
changes,”237 there still remain significant costs to be borne by the 
seller.238 For example, sellers will likely have to revamp their IT 
                                                                                                            
231 Stathopoulos, supra note 84, at 47. 
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233 See 159 CONG. REC. S. 2827–31 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2013) (statement of 
Sen. Wyden). 
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235 See, e.g., Stathopoulos, supra note 84, at 47. 
236 159 Cong. Rec. S. 2827–31 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2013) (statement of Sen. 
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237 Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. § 2(a)(ii) (2014). 
238 See, e.g., id. There are also ambiguities as to how exactly the free soft-
ware provision will work, and the meaning of “free of charge.” KPMG, supra 
note 224, at 4. Congresswoman Collins uses athletic apparel as an example of 
the complexity involved: 
In some States, clothing and athletic footwear are exempt from 
tax. In others, they are exempt only up to a certain price level. 
Yet other States make a distinction between clothing and foot-
wear used for athletic purposes—which they tax—and clothing 
and footwear used for general purposes—which they do not 
tax. In those States, systems must be programmed to correctly 
treat articles that can be viewed as either athletic apparel or 
general clothing, depending on the user. Board shorts, sneakers, 
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infrastructure in order to implement and integrate the new tax 
compliance software with their “existing billing, purchasing, and 
back-end technology.”239 For “multichannel retailers,” those who 
sell “online, through catalogs, over the phones, and in stores,” 
with unique order processing systems, this means that the new 
software must be “programmed to link to each component of 
their order processing systems,” which would be both costly and 
time-consuming.240 In addition, sellers would need to research 
the sales and use tax policies of every state in which they have 
customers, to ensure that they have programed their tax collec-
tion software correctly.241 Thus, although sellers would be given 
the software “free of charge” the many hidden expenses make it 
seemingly impossible for small businesses to maintain the level 
of compliance required by the MFA of 2015,242 suggesting that 
the small seller threshold be increased to $50 million.243 
Third, the MFA of 2015 gives the states “carte blanche” to 
impose more taxes on businesses.244 Currently, states that cannot 
legally require remote sellers to collect their sales tax rely on 
purchasers themselves to report and pay a compensating use tax.245 
However, since the MFA gives states the power to force remote 
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sellers to “play tax collector,” there is an incentive for states to 
increase the variety of items that are taxable, as well as their 
sales tax rates.246 To quote Congressman Baucus, “This bill is going 
to make it very desirable for States to start taxing and collecting on 
all sorts of services—not just the financial world but also on services 
provided by attorneys, architects, engineers, and accountants.”247 
Lastly, with the passage of the MFA of 2015, it is argued that 
consumers will pay an additional $22 billion in sales taxes.248 
Although the MFA calls for “no new taxes,”249 it allows states to 
enforce the collection of sales and use taxes that would have other-
wise gone uncollectible and unenforceable.250 Thus, although not 
literally prescribing a “new tax,” the additional tax revenue that will 
be generated by MFA of 2015 is “money that is going to come out of 
the pockets of American families that has not come out of their 
pockets before.”251 Consumers, as a result, will be less likely to 
shop online and the internet economy will bear the repercussions.252 
CONCLUSION 
The MFA of 2015, no doubt, raises Due Process, Commerce 
Clause, and administrative concerns. In terms of Due Process, 
the MFA will likely pass constitutional muster in a majority of 
situations, where a remote seller has made significant sales to 
the taxing state. However, there are fact patterns that shed 
light on the bill’s fundamental unfairness; for example, where a 
remote seller is required to submit to a state’s jurisdiction, de-
spite its single isolated sale there of nominal value. The bill also 
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raises Commerce Clause concerns by substituting “economic nexus” 
for “physical presence.” Since Congress has the plenary power to 
authorize state violations of the Commerce Clause, though not of 
the Due Process Clause, the question becomes, should it? 
If enacted, there are multiple administrative hurdles that the 
MFA will have to overcome. But if forgone, more and more 
states are likely to hop aboard the “click-through” and “affiliate” 
nexus bandwagons,253 putting Congress in a bind. Is it possible 
to pass a piece of legislation to grant states the authority they so 
wish—to force the collection of remote sales and use taxes—
without “overruling” Quill’s bright-line physical presence rule?254 
A look at Colorado’s statute, which imposes reporting obligations 
on remote retailers, answers this question in the affirmative. 
Under Colorado’s law, remote retailers, who do not qualify for a 
small seller exception,255 must: (1) provide transactional notices 
to Colorado purchasers, informing them that the retailer “has 
not collected sales or use tax,” that the purchase “is not exempt 
from Colorado sales or use tax,” and that “Colorado law requires 
the purchaser to file a sales or use tax return and to pay tax 
owed;”256 (2) send “annual purchase summaries” to Colorado cus-
tomers whose remote purchases exceed $500, informing them of 
their duty to “file a sales or use tax return at the end of every 
year;”257 and (3) send annual “customer information report[s]” to 
the Department, which list “purchasers’ names, billing addresses, 
shipping addresses, and total purchase amounts,”258 informing 
the Department of taxpayers who failed to pay the tax, so that it 
can pursue audit and collection actions against these taxpayers. 
Such a statute allows states to enforce use tax compliance without 
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stepping on the toes of Quill or the Constitution,259 since Quill 
only applies to collection requirements and not to reporting re-
quirements.260 Thus, instead of enacting the MFA of 2015, legis-
lation that will surely muddy the waters of an already complex 
tax system, Congress should consider enacting national report-
ing requirements. Such would ensure that Quill’s “precedential 
island would never expand but would, if anything, wash away 
with the tides of time,” making everyone happy.261 
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